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THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
It is not the purpose of the writer to discuss with
any degree of thoroughness any portion of the Statue
iof Frauds, but it is intended merely to call attention
to some peculiarities of the law in Pennsylvania, as
ccrnqs.red with the law of other states, a.nd to note the
statutes in force in Pennsylvania requiring a writing
to establish certain contracts and as a condition of
certain other rights.
The English Statute (29 Car. II., c. 3) enacted in
1677, was divided into twenty-four sections
The first
section provided that all parol transfers of interests in
land and not put in writing and signed by the party
-making the attempted transfer or his agent authorized
by writing should make the transferee a tenant at will
only, and this regardless of the consideration given and
notwithstanding the former custom of making transfers
of estates in land by livery and seizin.
The second
section excepted all leases which by their terms expired not later than three years from the date of their
making, (with a further qualification as to the rent reserved). The third section added to grants of interests
in land the assignment or surrender of such interests
and forbad such transfer "unless by deed or note in writing signed by the party so assigning, granting, or sur129 A. & E.Encyc. of Law P. 801.
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rendering the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully
authorized by writing, or by act and operation of law.'
The familiar fourth section forbids actions against an
executor or administrator on his express promise to be
personally responsible for a debt of the estate, actions
upon promises to pay the debt of anotiher, actions upon
ante-nuptial agreements, actions upon agreements to
sell land or interests therein and actions upon any agreement not to be performed within a year from the naking. Sections 5, 6, 12 and 19 to 24 inclusive relate to
wills. Section 7 to 11, inclusive, relate to declarations
of or creations of trusts. Section 13 to 15, inclusive,
relate to the signing and dating of judgments. Seetion
16 relates to executions. Section 18 relates to certain
recognizances. Section 25 relates to the estates of in.
testate narried women.
The seventeenth section was the familiar one reauiring that in order to be "good" a contract for the sale
of goods "for the price of ten pounds or upwards" , muLt
be evidenced by "sorne note or -memorandum in writing of the said bargain," "signed by the parties to be
charged by such contract, or their agents thereunto
lawfully authorized."
In Ewing vs. Tees, 1 Binney 450, Chief Justice Tilghman, after quoting the Pennsylvania Statutes of March
21, 1772: 1 Sm. L. 389, sec. 1, 2 Purdon 1754, says: "It
Is plain that our legislature had that (I. e. the English
Statute) before them, when they framed the act in quzestion; because that part of our law which I have recited,
is copied very nearly verbatim from the English law.
But there is a total anission of the fourth section of
the English statute, etc." He accordingly held that
there was no reason why an action for damages could
not 'be maintained in Pennsylvania for breach of a contract for the sale of land.
It is a curious fact that the fourth clause of tho
fourth section of the English statute relating to con-
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tracts for the sale of lands has been adopted in all the
United States except Pennsylvania. The fact remains
that the Courts of Pennsylvania hlive always refused to
enforce specifically a parol contract for the sale of land,
at the ouit of either party thereto. Various reasons have
been given and a failure to appreciate the true reason has
occasionally led judges of even our appellate courts to
make incorrect and misleading stateinents.
The Vendee's Remedies for Vendor's Non-conveyance," first when the contract is written, and second
when it is oral, have been reviewed in an able article in
11 Dickinson Law Review, p. 171.
So also the "Vendot's Remedies for Vendees Breach of Contract," both
under written and oral contracts, have been covered in
an article in 11 Dickinson Law Review, p. 195. We Will
merely refer the reader to these articles and to a summary in concise ifoam in 13 Dickinson Law Review at
page 221.
The Act of Apr. 22d, 1856, P. L. 53-, 2 Purdon 1757,
the fourth section o& which forbad the creation of ex-press trusts by parol, in its fifth, section required contracts for the sale of land to be in writing. The latter
section was repealed, however, by the Act of May 13th,
1857, P. L. 500. This provision of the English statute
has never been law in Pennsylvania except for this brief
period. The English statute requires that the agreement, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in
writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized." It is obvious that to specifically enforce
an oral promise to transtfer an interest in land would be
to give greater effect to a promise than may be given
to livery and seizin. This is why the courts require the
.Vendor'spromise to he in writing and signed by him or
his agent authorized In writing.
To get title to the
land the vendee must not have less than is required by
the Act of 1772. We are, therefore, surprised to find a
'29 Am & Eng. Encyc. of Law P. 1M6.
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judge of our Superior Court say: "The requirements of
the statute are answered by a memorandum in writing
signed by the party to be charged therewith."" The fact
is that a vendor cannot recover the price from the vendee, who has signed the contract, if the vendor himself
So again a
-has not signed, for want of rnutuality.
Justice of the Supreme Court has resorted to the fourth
section of the Act of 1856 relating to express trusts to
find the reason for requiring contracts for the sale of
land to 'be in writing in Pennsylvania. See S. Dep. &
T. Co. vs. Coal & Coke Co., 234 Pa. at 108.
It has always been held in Pennsylvania that the
agent of a vendor must have written authority but the
agent of a guarantor need not. Coqnpare Vanhorne vs.
Fricke, 6 S. & R. 90, and Martin vs. Duffy, 4 Phila. 75.
The only reason for such a difference is that the Act of
1772 expressly requires the agent of the grantor or lessor
to have written authority. The Act of 1856 says nothing about the form of the authority of an agent. It is
especially curious to find such an old rule of law as that
forbidding specific enforcement of an oral sale attributed to as recent a statute as the Act of 1856 and it is
a coincidence that that very statute should have had a
section in it relating to contracts for sale of land, which
The remarkable
was stricken out the following year.
way in which the justice mits the words showing the
true subject of the fourth section, in order to make it
serve his purpose, is also noteworthy.
Another case in which a Supreme Court Justice exhibited his confusion of ideas is found in Twitchell vs.
Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 212. At p. 220, Justice Read says:
"It is an essential requisite by our Act of Assembly in
a contract for the purchase of lands, in order to enable
a vendor to enforce specific performance of it, that the
agent of the purchaser be authorized by writing." As
a matter of fact, since purchasers do not sign conveyances, they need not sign contracts of purchase and an

I Schultz v Burlock, 6 Super. 574.
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oral authority to an agent to sign is perfectly good.
Contracts signed by the vendor only are specifically enforceable by both parties, while those signed by the
vendee only are not specifically enforceable by either.
Only two provisions of the fourth section of the
English statute are ipart of the law of Pennsylvania.
These were enacted on April 26, 1855, P. L. 308, 2 Purdon 1759. They are the two first provisions relating to
promises by executors or administrators and promises
to answer for the debt or default of another.
For a
full discussion of this statute and the construction placed
upon it, see the article in 24 Dickinson Law Review 223.
This statute was followed the next year by the
statute of April 2, 1856, P. L. 532, 2 Purdon 1757, the
fourth section of which declares that both declarations
or creations of trusts of land and all grants and assignments thereof, "shall be manifested by witing, signed
by the party holding the title thereof, or by his last will
in writing, or else to be void," excepting however resulting and constructive trusts.
A parol declaration of
trust as to personal estate is not within the statute.
On June 12th, 1878, (P. L. 205), 4 Purdon 4044, a
statute was passed which provided that a grantee of real
estate should not be personally liable for the payment
of an encumbrance which bound the land when granted,
"unless he shall, by an agreanent in writing, have expressly assumed a liability therefore, or there shall be
express words in the deed of conveyance stating that the
grant is made on condition of the grantee assuming such
personal liability." It further provided that "the use
of the words, 'under and subject to the 1payMent of such
ground rent, anortgage or other encumbrance,' shall not
alone be so construed as to make .such grantee personally liable." The second section of the act requires the
holder of the encumbrance to be a party to the agreement assuming personal liability, if 'he is to enforce it,
and terminated the personal liability upon a second grant
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of the encumbered property in the absence of a further
agreement continuing such liability. The attempts of
the Supreme Court to construe this act have been so
conflicting that it has been declared to be "absolutely
unintelligible." See 18 Dickinson Law Review, at page
172. Prior to this act a verbal promise of a grantee of
encumbered real estate made to his grantor to pay the
mortgage debt, though the grantor himself was not personally bound, was held enforceable by the creditor
though he was not a party to such contract. Merriman
vs. Moore, 90 Pa. 78. It was not contended that such
a promise camne within the Act of 1855 relating to promises to pay the debt of another.
On June 8, 1881, (P. L. 84) an act was passed which
precluded proof of a parol agreement that a deed for
real estate was intended to take effect as a mortgage.
A defeagance (nust have been made at the time the deed
was made, be in writing, signed, sealed, acknowledged
and delivered by the grantee in the deed to the grantor
and be recorded within sixty days from the date of
execution.
Prior to this 'act deeds could be converted
into mortgages by parol testimony. Pearson vs. Sharp,
115 Da. 254. This act was used to -perpetrate the grossest frauds upon unschooled borrowers of money. For
a scathing condemnation of the act, see 11 Dick. L. Rev.
93. It was amended by the Act of April 22, 1909, P. L.
137, 5 Purdon 5908, requiring only that the agreement of
defeasance be signed and delivered to -the grantor in the
deed. As against the holder of the deed, it may now be
rede subsequently to the deed. It may not have been
sealed nor acknowledged nor recorded. But as against
a later grantee or mortgagee for value, it must have
been recorded before the subsequent deed or mortgage.
In its present form it may be hoped that the statute will
prevent more frauds than it occasions. See 15 Dick. L.
Rev. at ,page 83.
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On May 10th, 1881, P. L. 17, 3 Purdon 3306, the
first statute was passed requiring acceptances of drafts
to be in writing, "signed by the accepter or his lawful
agent." Like the act relating to pracmises to pay the
debt of another it excepted transactions involving less
than twenty dollars. The 132d section of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1901, P. L. 194, 3 Purdon 3305,
merely provides that the acceptance of a bill must tbe in
writing, and signed by the drawee.
Sections 30 and 31 of ,the Negotiable Instruments
Act Drovide that bills and notes payable to order may be
negotiated only by the indorsement of the holder written on the instrument itself or upon a paper attached
thereto. Like provisions nmy be found in the Unifoi'm
camnercial Acts with reference to the transfer of title
to a ceitifcate of stock, (Sec. 1 of Act of May 5, 1911,
P. L. page 126) to an order bill of lading, (Sec. 34 of
Act of June 9th, 1911, P. L. page 838), and to an order
warehouse receipt, (Sec. 43 of Act of March 11, 1909,
P. L. page 18). Section 16 of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act requires that authority to alter a bill of lading
must be written or the alteration is void. Section 9, b,
of the Unform Warehouse Recei[pts Act requires that
one must have written authority Irom the one to whom
the goods are deliverable by the terns of a non-negotiable receipt or the warehousenman is not justified in
making delivery.
Section 47, 3d sub-section, of the Uniform Sales Act,
as anended in Pennsylvania, Act of May 19, 1915 P. L.
543, 6 Purdon 7480. provides that when a buyer of goods
idirects or agrees that they be shipped C. 0. D., the buyer
is not entitled to examine the goods before payment of
the price, in the absence of 'agreement and proper written authority to the carrier permitting such examination.
The words printed in black type are not part of the
foilm Sales Act -as drafted by the conimissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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Section 122 of the Negotiable Instruments Act requires that if the holder of sudh an instrument would
renounce his rights against any party to the instrument,
it must be in writing, unless the instruanent be delivered
up to the person primarily liable thereon.
Certain notices are required to be in writing. For
example, a surety in a written promnise to pay imoney
at a future time shall not be discharged from liability
by reason of notice to the creditor to collect from the
princ~pal, unless such notice be in writing and signed
by the principal. Act of May 14, 1874, P. L. page 157,
3 Purdon 3661. So too when a lease is for less than one
year, or by the month, or for an indeterminate time,
if the landlord desire to regain possession, he shall serve
a notice in writing. Act of March. 31st, 1905, P. L. 87,
6 Purdon 6513.
It will be remembered that the Act of 1856, requiring express trusts of land to be in writing excepted resulting trusts. But by the Act of June 4th, 1901, P. L.
page 425, 2 Purdon 1758, it is provided that if a resulting trust arise in land by reason of the payment of the
purchase money by one person and the taking of the
legal title in the name of another, and the person advancing the purchase money has capacity to contract,
the trust slhall be void as to bona fide judginent or
other creditors or mortgagees of the holder of the legal
t-itie or purchasers from ,him without notice, unless a
declaration of trust in writing has been executed and
acknowledged by the holder of the legal title and recorded in the county where the land is or unless the
one advancing the purchase money has begun an action
of ejectment in said county.
The 17th section of the English statute relating to
sales of goods was no part of the law of Pennsylvania
until the Uniform Sales Act was passed on May 19th,
1915, P. L. page 543, 6 Purdon 7473. The fourth section of the Sales Act provides that, "A contract to sell
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or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value
of five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by action -unless the buyer shall accept part of the
goods or choses in action so contracted to be -sold or
sold, and actually receive the same, or give something
in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or
unless some note or memorandum dn writing of the
contract or sale be signed 'by the party to be charged
or his agent in that -behalf."
The most conspicuous
change from the English Statute is, of course, the raising of the amount to which the statute applies from
ten ,pounds to five hundred dollars. But a comparison
of the language will disclose five changes in phraseology,
all worting for greater clearness and amply justified in
his discussion of this section of the act by the learned
draftsman. See Williston on Sales, pages 59 to 154.
It is not pretended that the foregoing is a complete
list of the Pennsylvania statutes because of which the
omission of a writing may prove fatal to a party's rights
but it has been thought that, as so few of the statutes
mentioned are collected in the digests -under the title,
"Statute of Frauds" it would serve a useful purpose
if they were collected and attention called to the fact
that they are all statutes enacted with the same purpose in view, namely to render it more difficult to enforce a pretended right by ameans of false testimony.
JOSEPH P. McKEEHAN.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH vs. ROBERTS
Murder-Evidence--Previous Threats, When Admissible--Premedi.
tation-Character.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Murder. Evidence that Roberts had threatened to kill three
different persons within three weeks and before the killing of
Arlington, for killing whom he was on trial, no connection was
shown between these three persons and Arlington. The Court
admitted the evidence.
Glass for Commonwealth.
Schnee for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
HAND, J.-The sole question presented by this case Is whether
evidence of threats to kill certain persons may be introduced against
the threatening party who is on trial for the murder of one entirely
unconnected with the threats, or with the parties previously threatened.
Such evidence, if we understand the law correctly, is inadmissable. The great weight of authority supports this view, and the
cases in this Commonwealth, though scarce, are decisive.
The purpose of the prosecution in attempting to introduce evidence of the previously uttered threats would be twofold: First to
blacken the character of the defendant by showing that he had
a quarrelsome, murderous disposition, if possible: Second to show
some premeditation of the killing. As to the first point, it is a well
settled rule of evidence that the prosecution cannot attack the
defendant's character unless he himself has made it an issue. As
to the second point, since there has been no attempt to show any
connection between the threats and the killing for which the prisoner is being tried, it is entirely irrelevant to show a premeditation in
the killing of Arlington. General threats, that is, threats against
some indefinite person, might be sufficient to show a general premeditation which might attach to a specific crime subsequently
perpetrated, and on this theory, they are generally held to be
admissable. But the threats in the case at bar were specific threats
against definite, ascertained persons.
We have carefully examined the cases cited by the Commonwealth, but find nothing in them that deal with threats against
specific third persons, prior to a homicide. It has cited Hopkins vs.
Commonwealth, in 50 Pa. 9, which is one of the leading cases hold-
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Sng that general threats are admissable to show a general malice.
'9 Pa. 311, and 156 Pa. 304 are entirely beside the point.
In 21 cyc 923, it is said "Threats against a person other than
the deceased are only admissable under circumstances which show
some connection with the injury." Numerous cases were cited to
support this proposition, one of which, Abernethy v Commonwealth,
was cited by the counsel for the appellant, in his able brief. A
brief resume of this case will be given here, as we believe it governs
the case at bar.
Abernethy, being somewhat under the influence of intoxicants,
became engaged in an altercation with one Kain, and an unknown
man, and subsequently threatened to kill Kain, "or somebody,"
meaning Kain's companion, who had struck him. Later in the day
the prisoner picked a separate quarrel with the deceased, who struck
at him and was immediately killed by Abernethy. This quarrel
and its unfortunate termination was in no way connected with the
threats against Kain and his companion, and evidence of such
threats were held inadmissable. The decision in Abernethy v Commonwealth really goes farther that it would be necessary to go in
the case at bar, since the threats and the killing occurred on the
same day, and were slightly connected by other circumstances.
In admitting evidence of threats unconnected with the crime,
the Court below committed a reversible error.
Judgment reversed, with v. f. d. n.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
A threat has no importance unless it expresses the purpose.
of the threatener. It may be made in jest; or simply to awaken
fear. So made, it would have no importance as a piece of evidence
in a murder ease.
Threats were made in this ease to kill three different persons.
Let us suppose them seriously made. Then they would indicate a
murderous purpose toward three different persons. But would the
existence of this purpose be a relevant fact?
Could the actual killing of these persons be proved to prove a
homicidal bent? Certainly not. But if the killing would not be
provable, why would the incompleted purpose to kill, be? The accused cannot be proved to have murderous proclivities, whether by
evidence of actual killings, or of threats to kill. We think the
learned Court below has properly held the proof inadmissable.
The imperfect report of the facts in Commonwealth v Page, 265
Pa. 273, makes interpretation of the case dubious. The Court's remarks, "Though the threats were not made to Brady, his victim,
they were evidence of an intention to kill somebody, and were
therefore admissable as showing his malice," are not understand-
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able in the absence of a better report of the case. The general
proposition that in trying X for the killing of Y, one could prove
that X had threatened to kill Z, who had no connection with Y,
would be wholly inadmissable. Malice toward one man cannot be
proved in order to infer malice toward another unrelated person.
Cf. 2 Criminal Law, 999 et seq.
The judgment of the learned Court below is therefore
AFFIRMED.

HARRISON v COAL COMPANY
Negligence-Elements of Damages for Personal Injuries-Measure
of Damages-Pain and Suffering-Earning Power-Prexent
Worth of Damages for Future Pain and Suffering.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harrison was injured in a mine of the defendant through its
negligence. He suffered grievous injuries which have disfigured
him and made walking difficult, subjecting him to constant pain,
as well as lessening his earning power for the future. The Court
did not direct the jury to find the present worth of the pain and
suffering, mental and physical, which the plaintiff endured or may
endure in the future, which is assigned as an error and for which the
defendant has taken this appeal.
Glowa, for plaintiff.
Beaver, for defendant.
OPINION OF LOWER COURT
KELCHNER, J.-The only question raised is the right of the
defendant to instructions from the trial court directing the jury
to allow only the present worth of damages for future pain and
suffering. Such instructions were here given as to damages for
diminution of future earning power, but declined as to pain and
suffering because of the impracticability thereof.
Justice Williams, in 177 Pa. 14, says: "Damages for personal
injuries through negligence consist of three principle items; first,
the expenses to which the injured person is subjected by reason of
the injury complained of; second, the inconvenience and suffering
naturally resulting from it; third, the loss of earning power, if any,
and whether temporary or permanent, consequent upon the character of the injury."
Where the action is for injuries to the person through negligence, the jury may consider without special averment, pain and
suffering, expense incurred for medical treatment and loss of time

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

for inability to work at the usual occupation of the injured person,
inasmuch as these are the natural and usual results of an injury.
Long v. Colder, 8 Barr 479; Penna. and Ohio Canal Co. v. Graham,
68 Pa. 299; 259 Pa. 56.
Our early Pennsylvania decisions have held that, pain and suffering have not a market price or value, but it is left to the good
judgment and common sense of the jury to say to what amount
the plaintiff should be compensated or what amount should be allowed for the pain and suffering he has endured or may probably
endure in the future. Money is an inadequate recompense for
pain, but, the law aids the sufferer to obtain it in such measure as
a jury, considering all the circumstances will allow. 20 Phila.
261; 53 Pa. 276; 77 Pa. 109; 243 Pa. 252.
Pain and suffering are not capable of being exactly measured
by an equivalent in money, and we have repeatedly said that they
have no market price. The question in any given case Is not what
it would cost to hire some one to undergo the measure of pain alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff, but, what under all the
circumstances should be allowed the plaintiff in addition to the
other items of damage to which he is entitled, in consideration. of
suffering necessarily endured. This should not be estimated by a
sentimental or fanciful standard but in a reasonable manner, as it
is wholly additional to the pecuniary compensation afforded by
the first and third items, referred to above, that enter into the
amount of the verdict in such cases.
It is equally well settled that this rule admits of compensation
for future as well as past pain and suffering. With what degree
of certainty must it be made to appear that the future pain and
suffering will ensue before compensation for them can be allowed?
One unvarying rule has been observed regarding the quantum of
proof required, and it is this-the jury may and should award compensation for future pain and suffering whenever the evidence furnishes just ground for the belief that such pain and suffering
will likely or probably ensue.
In the recent cases, Bostwick v Pittsburg Railway Co. 255
Pa. 367; Sebastian v Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co.,
262 Pa. 510; and Ford v Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron
Co., 262 Pa. 514, which were actions to recover damages for personal injuries, it was held: In negligence cases involving personal
injuries, the rule which requires the court to instruct the jury
to allow the present worth of future damages, does not apply
in awarding compensation for pain, suffering and inconvenience.
Since there is no error in the opinion of the lower court, the
assignment of error is overruled and the appeal is dismissed.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
It is quite evident that pain is not susceptible of exact compensation by any pecuniary standard, as says Williams, J.; Musick
v Latrobe, 184 Pa. 375; Bostwick v Pittsburg Rwys. Co, 255 Pa.
387. Its degree, its quality, is not susceptible of exact appreciation
by any court or jury, for no description is adequate, and the experience needful to understand the description is wanting.
Nevertheless, the jury is allowed to suppose the pain, which
has been endured, say for six months, and to say that for that pain,
a certain sum of money should be paid as compensation for the improper causation of it. But, if the endurance of pain of a given
quality and intensity, through six months should receive say, $500,
as a solatium, it is hard to see why, if endured for the next six
months, the further solatium of $500 should not be paid, and a
third for the third half-year of pain, etc.
There is the risk of course, that the plaintiff will not live, as
well as not suffer if he lives, but the risk is run, when damages for
loss of future earning power are allowed.
If the compensation for future pain should be as great as for
past pain, of the same degree and kind and duration, it would seem
logically to follow that payment being made now, for the pain of
the future, only the present worth of the money that would represent the compensation, had the pain been suffered, should be allowed
for future suffering.
But not already having prescribed that the present worth of
future pain only should be allowed, "we will not," say the Supreme
Court, "extend the rule which requires courts to instruct juries to
allow only the present worth of future damages, so as to include
th element of pain, suffering and inconvenience." Not having propounded a principle hitherto, may be a warrant for not propounding
it now. The refusal seems to work in some cases in favor of the
plaintiff, for in Ford v Phila. etc. Co. 262 Pa. 514, and Bostwick v
Pittsburgh Rwys. Co., 255 Pa. 387, it is the defendant who complains
that the court refused to state to the jury the present worth principle.
The judgment of the learned court below must be affirmed.
COLLINS v TOWNSHIP
Negligence-Township-Dangerous road-Guard rail-Question for
jury-Proximate cause--Imputed negligence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At a certain point, a township road took a sudden turn. It
was there narrow. On one side was a railroad, on the other a de-
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clivity at the foot of which was a river. Collins, invited by a
friend, was riding in a carriage belonging to the friend and driven
by him. There was no guard-rail at the curve or bend of the road.
An approaching train startled the horse, which ran down the declivity, seriously injuring Collins. This is a suit for damages.
The allegation of plaintiff is that the township should have maintained a guard-rail. Defense was (a) no duty to maintain the
guard-rail, (b) negligence of the driver of the carriage, who could
have taken a less dangerous road, and a safer horse. Collins had
never been on the road before, and had no knowledge of the disposition of the horse.
Glickman for plaintiff.
Kelly for defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
GLOWA, J-After a careful consideration of the case at bar,
we find that two questions present themselves. First, whether or
not it was the duty of the township to maintain a guard rail at
the curve or bend of the road, and secondly if the driver of the carriage was negligent, could his negligenec be imputed to Collins, his
invited guest and thus bar a recovery.
As a general rule the rights and duties of the public and a
municipality at a public crossing are mutual and reciprocal and
both are charged with the mutual duty of keeping a careful lookout
to avoid inflicting or receiving injury, the degree of diligence to
be used on either side being such as a prudent person would exercise under the circumstances at the particular time and crossing
in endeavoring to perform his duty. Texas and Pacific Railway
Co. v Cody, 166 U. S. 606. Continental Improvement Co. v Stead,
95 U. S. 161.
A traveler is bound to use ordinary care in approaching the
crossings and observing the approach of trains. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co. v Goodman, 62 Pa. 329. And the railroad company
is bound to use such care in giving proper and timely warning
of their approach, and to otherwise use what, under the circumstances are reasonable precautions in approaching the crossings.
33 Cyc. 924.
At Common Law no action could be maintained against a town
for a defective highway. There are courts which hold incorporated townships not liable for damages, but upon this question the
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authorities are not agreed, and differ as to where the weight of
authority lies. But while they differ in this respect, they are
almost unanimous in holding that an action cannot be maintained
against counties and townships unless authorized by statute, for
damages sustained through their neglect to keep their highways
in repair, although the duty of doing so is clearly enjoined upon
them by law.
But in Pennsylvania the duty imposed by statute on townships
to keep the highway in repair (Laws 1836) is held to create
a liability for neglect of this duty.
In an action for injuries to a passenger where the wagon
was upset by reason of the absence of guard railings at a dangerous point, it was held that, even if the erection of barriers interfered with a right of way to a mill used by the owner and the
public, it was within the power of the township to have erected
them if they were necessary to render the road safe. Kelly v Mayberry Township, 154 Pa. 440. And where a road is so narrow that
a slight deviation leads to the edge of a precipice, it is the duty of
the township to errect guard railings. Trexler v Greenwich Township, 168 Pa. 214; Lydia Betting v Township of Maxatawney, 177,
Pa. 213; Cage v Township of Franklin, 11 Sup. Ct. 533. It was the
duty of the township to keep all places of minifest danger properly
guarded, and to maintain the roads in a reasonably safe condition,
and the measure of this duty must be determined by the circumstances of the particular case. Finnegan 'v Foster Township, 163
Pa. 138.
From the foregoing authorities, we conclude that there is no
question as to the duty of the township to maintain guard railings along dangerous points of its roads.
Now, we come to the second question in the case, namely,
if the driver of the carriage was negligent, could his negligence
be imputed to Collins, his invited guest, and thus bar recovery.
But, supposing he was negligent in failing to do what the law
requires, can we attribute his negligence to an invited guest, who
had no control over him whatsoever?
In 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 446, it is said that where the
question is whether the person injured is chargeable with the
contributory negligence of a driver or person with whom he was
riding, as a guest by special invitation, or because of some special
relationship, there has been and still is, much conflict among the
authorities, but the true principle seems to be that when a person
is injured by the negligence of the defendant and the contributory
negligence of one with whom the injured person is riding as a guest
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or companion, such negligence is not imputable to the injured person. The Pennsylvania authorities there cited are: Borough
of Carlisle v Brisbane, 113 Pa. 544. Dean v Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 129 Pa. 514. Carr v Easton, 142 Pa. 139.
The rule laid down by the leading English decdsion is that the
negligence of a carrier will be imputed to a passenger injured by
the negligence of a third person to which the carrier contributed
and this doctrine has been adopted by a few English and American
decisions. The decision has, however, been expressly overruled in
England and disapproved by the United States Supreme Court and
the great weight of authority is to the effect that the negligence
of a carrier will not be imputed to a passenger who is injured
by the concurrent negligence of the carrier and another and who
exercises and can exercise no control over such carrier. Under
this rule the negligence of the driver of a public carriage will
not be imputed to a passenger. 29 Cyc. 547.
While there are some decisions to the contrary, the great
weight of authority, including that of the courts of Pennsylvania,
is that the negligence of the driver of a private conveyance will
not be imputed to a person riding with him but who has no
authority or control over him. Little v Central District and Printing Telegraph Co., 213 Pa. 229. Borough of Carlisle v Brisbane,
113 Pa 544. Mann v Weiand, 81* Pa. 243. Jones v Lehigh & New
England Railroad Co., 202 Pa. 81. Bunting v Hogsett, 139 Pa. 313.
Finnegan v Foster Township, 163 Pa. 135.
In the case of Jones v Railroad Co., 202 Pa. 81, an omnibus drawn by four horses and containing more than twenty people
reached the crossing of the defendant's road as a train approached
it. A collision ensued in which eight of the passengers were
killed and as many were injured. The driver exercised no care
whatever to avoid danger. The court held that the negligence
of the omnibus driver could not be imputed to the passengers.
In the case of Mann v Weiand, 81* Pa. 243, it was held that
the negligence of the driver of a private vehicle could not be imputed to a companion riding with him, who has no control or
authority over the driver or his team, in case such companion is
injured in a runaway of the horses frightened by the attacks of
vicious dogs belonging to a third person.
There was no evidence whatever in the case at bar that Collins knew that the driver was reckless and that the horse was unmanageable for Collins had never been with the driver before and
had never been over this particular road and from the facts of the
case it appears that he had no knowledge of the disposition of the
horse.
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The case clearly shows that the Township was negligent in
failing to maintain guard rails where the road took a sudden turn
and hence is not entitled to the presumption of having exercised
proper care. On the other hand, there was no evidence to show
that the driver of the carriage was negligent, therefore he is presumed to have exercised due care.
In view of the above decisions, we render a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Besides the cases cited by the learned court below, Kammerdiener v. Rayburn Township, 233 Pa. 328, may be relied on to
support the conclusion reached.
Affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH v HARPER
Murder-Defense of Insanity-Burden of Proof-Quantum of Evidence required-Irresistible Impulse-Omission by Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Murder by shooting. Defense of insanity. The court told the
jury that Harper was bound to satisfy by a preponderence of evidence that he was unable to realize that the use of the weapon
might result in injury to the person whom he shot and killed; that
the burden was not on the Commonwealth to prove sanity, but on
the defendant to persuade the jury of insanity. Verdict of guilty
of first degree murder.
UNGER, J.In
support of his motion for a new trial the defendant alleges several errors of the court in its charge to the jury.
The defendant, Harper, was tried on the charge of murder, and
as a defense, pleaded insanity at the time of the shooting. In giving its instructions to the jury, the court told them (1) that the
burden of satisfying them of the defendant's insanity at the time of
the murder was upon the defendant; (2) that he was bound to satisfy them that he was unable to realize that the use of the weapon
might result in injury to the person whom he shot and killed. We
shall dispose of the three grounds of error in the above order respectively.
Upon whom does the burden of proving insanity rest? The
rule in this respect has become so well established by'the courts in
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this state that an extended discussion seems unnecessary. That
the law presumes the sanity of the persons governed by it and
amenable to it until the contrary is shown, is both sensible and just.
In Com. v. Dale, 264 Pa. 362, Justice Kephart said: "The defense
of the accused was insanity, and the burden was on him to prove
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he was insane when
he killed Swartz." In Com. v Heidler, 191 Pa. 375, it was held to
be the law "that the burden of proof of insanity is with the defense
from the beginning, and never shifts." Other cases to the same
effect are Com. v Wireback, 190 Pa. 138. Coyle v Com., 100 Pa.
573. State v Quigley, 26 R. I. 263. Wigmore's Cases). Com. v.
George Winnmore, 1 Brewster, 356. Com. v Frank Beckwith, 27
Pa. C. C. 164.
The second ground of error in the court's charge relates to the
quantum of evidence required of the defendant, by law, "to satisfy
the jury of the defendant's insanity." In this case the court told
the jury that the defendant was bound to satisfy them "by a preponderance" of evidence. Altho it is conceded that the phrase more
commonly used by the courts when instructing the jury in this regard, is "by a fair preponderance," or, "by fairly preponderating"
evidence, we cannot see that the defendant was in anywise prejudiced by the use of the expression "by a preponderance" of
evidence. Com. v Dale, 264 Pa. 362. That the law requires more
than the raising of a doubt, or a reasonable doubt in the minds of
the jury, is hardly open to argument. Pannell v Com., 86 Pa. 260.
Com. v Heidler, 191 Pa. 375. Coyle v Com., 100 Pa. 573. Ortwein
v Com., 76 Pa. 414. Com. v Frank Beckwith, 27 Pa. C. C. 481.
The final specification of error set out by the defendant as
ground for new trial, has to do with the degree or extent of insanity which the law in this state recognizes as sufficient to relieve the
defendant of criminal responsibility. The court's instruction to
the jury was "that the defendant was bound to satisfy them that
he was unable to realize that the use of the weapon might result in
injury to the person whom he shot and killed." Was this burden
upon the defendant in order for him to prove his insanity? Such
a direction was, in effect, the placing of a restriction or limitation
on the defendant as to the manner in which he must show his insanity. We are disposed to think that the instruction was too narrow. It was stated in Com. v Wireback, 190 Pa. 138, that where
insanity, whether general or partial, is set up as a defense to an
indictment for murder, the degree of it must be so great as to have
controlled the will of its subject, and to have taken away from
him the freedom of moral action. Also Ortwein v Com., 76 Pa. 414.
Again, Chief Justice Gibson speaking for the court in 4 Barr 24,
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and again used by the court in Coyle v Com., 100 Pa. 573, said:
"There may be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind drawing it
to consequences which it sees but cannot avoid, and placing it under
a coercion which, while its results are clearly perceived, is incapable of resistance. The doctrine which acknowledges this mania is
dangerous in its relations, and can be recognized only in the clearest cases. It ought to be shown to have been habitual, or, at least,
to have evinced itself at more than a single instance." In other
words the law in this state recognizes a form or degree of insanity,
where the case is a clear one, in which the defendant is carried off
by an irresistible impulse to commit the crime, though at the time
realizing the consequences of his act. This fact the court failed
to take into consideration when it charged the jury in the present
case. Taylor v Com., 109 Pa. 262. Ortwein v Com., 76 Pa. 414.
Com. v George Winnmore, 1 Brewster 356. Com. v De Marza, 223
Pa. 573. Com. v Frank Beckwith, 27 Pa. C. C. 481. Com. v Mosler,
4 Pa. 264. Com. v Fritch, 9 Pa. C. C. 164.
Believing, as we do, that the rights of the defendant may have
been violated by the charge of the court in the last respect, the
court is constrained to grant the defendant's motion for a new
trial.
Motion Granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
There are at least two forms of insanity recognized by the
courts in Pennsylvania; one is such defect of mind as renders it
incapable of seeing the relation between what it does, and death
as its effect Another is the irresistible impulse which may drive a
man to commit the lethal act altho he knows that death will be
its consequence. The burden of proving either form of insanity
is on the defendant by a preponderance of evidence.
The court gives no instruction as to the proof of the insanity
that consists of an irresistible impulse. The burden to prove it is
plainly on the defendant by preponderating evidence. For the defective instructions to the jury, the conviction has to be set aside
and the judgment of the court below.
AFFIRMED.
HENDRICKS v WM. STAPLES, (EXECUTOR)
Amendment-When Amendment is Not Allowed-Action
Personal Injuries

For

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was for personal injuries inflicted thru negligence.
John Staples, (whose executor Win. Staples is) was conceived to be
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the negligent agent. After the action had been pending for 34
months, the plaintiff obtained a rule to show cause for the changing of the name of the defendant, Wn. Staples, omitting the office
of executor. The amendment being allowed, the evidence showed
that Win. Staples caused the injury, and a verdict and judgment
was secured for the plaintiff for $300.
Gallagher, for the plaintiff.
Fox, for defendant.
M. GARBER, J-No amendment can be allowed which brings
a new party into the action. If the effect of this amendment was
merely to correct the name under which the right party was sued,
it should be allowed. But if its effect was to bring a new party
into the action and to deprive him of the benefits of the Statute of
Limitations, it should not be allowed. Wright v Eureka Tampered Copper Co., 206 Pa. 275.
As the action stood before amendment, the suit was not against
Win. Staples, but against John Staples. Wm.Staples, Executor,
was named as defendant, because in his capacity as Executor he
stood in place of the deceased John Staples. To drop the word executor from the name of the defendant, would amount to an absolute change of the defendants, for thus John Staples, represented
by Wm.Staples, Executor, would be released, and an entirely different person, i. e., Win. Staples, in his own private capacity, would
be substituted.
But all persons except Win. Staples, Executor, are now protected against suit for this negligent act, by the Limitations of
Actions, for personal injuries, Act 1895 P. L. 236.
The amendment should not have been allowed. 190 Pa. 364.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Conceiving John Staples to have been the negligent cause of
injury to the plaintiff, Hendricks, and Staples having died, Hendricks sued Wn. Staples, as his executor. His intention was to
make John's Estate liable. The plaintiff when more than three
years had elapsed since the injury, changed his conception of its
source, pursuading himself that Wim. Staples was the guilty party.
He then asked for and obtained leave to drop the word "executor"
and he desired substitution for John Staple's Estate, Wm.Staples.
This was virtually beginning suit against Wm.Staples, at a time
when the action against him was barred. The amendment should
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not have been allowed and the plea of the statute of limitations
should have been made to prevail. Bender v Penfield, 235 Pa. 58.
AFFIRMED.

STOKES v. HARMON
Note- Possession in Maker--Mistake as to Payment- Destruction--Parol Evidence of Contents-Statute of May 15, 1901Evidence and Presumption of Discharge-Burden of Proof
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Suit on note for $2000. Stokes thinking it had been paid, returned it to Harmon, who knowing that it had not been paid, received and destroyed it. Stokes has subsequently discovered his error,
and sues on the destroyed note.
Kelsey, for the plaintiff.
Kreps, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MALLIN, J. It must be admitted as a matter of fact, that
the return of the note by Harmon was made through a bona-fide
mistake of fact, and that the defendant accepted the same, with
knowledge of its not having been paid. We must also concede that
the plaintiff, in order to have established the fact herein stated,
must have carried the burden of proof. These facts were determined by the trial court below, and are indisputable in the case
at bar. We must proceed to the question of law left to our determination.
In absence of statute, and in accordance with the decisions
held in McKibben v. Doyle, 173 Pa. 579; Reed v. Horn, 143 Pa.
323; and in 23 Superior 615, which held that money erroneously
paid, under a mistake may be recovered, we would be obliged
to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Without going further into the discussion of the change of
the common law remedies on the point in issue, but in view of
the present statute of May 15, 1901, (P. L. 210), at section 123,
where "A cancellation made unintentionally or under a mistake,
or without authority of the holder, is inoperative; but where an instrument, or any signature thereon, appears to have been cancelled, the burden of proof lies on the party who alleges the
cancellation was made unintentionally, or under a mistake, or
without authority," we decide that this statute embraces the very
ease at bar, and thereby enter judgment for the plaintiff.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Where the possession of the note by the maker is unexplained, the presumption would be, that it had been paid, or the payment of it had been released.
But, presumption is rendered nugatory, by proof of the circumstances of the maker's possession. It had been returned to
him by the payee under the belief that it had been paid. This
was a mistaken belief. The defendant had in fact not paid it.
The learned court below, has properly held that the amount
specified on the note, can be recovered by the plaintiff.
When an instrument has been lost or innocently destroyed,
the contents can be proved by parol, and a suit may be maintained upon it, as thus proved. Gangawer's Estate, 265 Pa. 512,
at 518.
Judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

SCHNELLENBERGER v. TOMPKINS
Evidence-Credibility of Witnesses-Right of Witness to Explain
and Agentor Deny Impeaching Testimony -Principal
Principal Bound by Statement Made by Agent in Scope of
His Authority.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Suit on a lost note for $300. X, agent of Tompkins, testified
that the latter had paid the note, and received it from the plaintiff and had destroyed it. Plaintiff, on rebuttal, called three
witnesses to testify that three months after the time of the payment, as alleged by X, he had stated that the note had not been
paid, but had been lost by the plaintiff. X was still in court when
this testimony was given. He was recalled by the defendant and
reiterated his testimony but made no statement concerning his
alleged statement. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial.
Farrel, for plaintiff.
Kelly, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
SIMMONS, J. It appears that the court below received as
evidence, the testimony of the plaintiff's three witnesses without first asking X, the agent of the defendant, on cross-examination whether he had made the alleged contradictory statements
or not. The plaintiff had not asked the agent X concerning this
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matter on trial and the defendant contends that the court below
erred in admitting his testimony as evidence. The Queen's Case,
which is cited by the counsel for the defendant as authority for
this contention, appears to bear him out in his contention, but
the decision in this case, (Queen's Case), was so diverse from
the ordinary trend of the law that, although a few courts followed it and handed down decisions in accordance with it's doctrine, it was never finally adopted as law by any of the States
of the Union, (17 Mass. 166). Some of the earlier Pennsylvania decisions appeared to have followed this doctrine but they
later perceived the error in it and the later decisions hold otherwise.
In Walden v. Finch, 70 Pa. 460, Judge Agnew, in delivering
his opinion, admitting that former decisions have been to the contrary, says "we are therefore of the opinion that those decisions
of our court are to be preferred which hold that the question
is one of sound discretion in the judge trying the cause upon
the circumstances before him. When the witnesses are all present and the contradiction tends seriously to impair the credibility of the witness or to reflect upon his character, a court would
feel bound to give him the opportunity of explanation or denial
before suffering his testimony to be impeached by counter statements."
In Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108, it is stated "whether
his attention must first be called to the matter (whether the
witness is cross-examined to give opportunity'for explanation)
rests in the sound discretion of the judge, and unless that discretion be abused, its exercise is not ground for reversal."
It does not appear from the facts that the lower court
abused, in any manner, his discretion to admit or reject the
evidence in question, and, since this is true and he decided to
admit the testimony as evidence, there is no good reason at
law why it should again be reviewed by this court.
There may be some doubt as to whether X made his alleged
contradictory statement while acting in his capacity of agent
for the defendant or not. If he made the statement alleged
to have been made by him in the scope of his authority as agent
then the principal-the defendant-is responsible for the statement because X, in such case, is only the mere instrument of
the defendant, (Ashmore v. Pa. Steam Towing & Transportation Co., 38 N. J. L. 13).
After duly considering the facts of the case as submitted
and giving due weight to the arguments advanced and decisions
cited by the able attorneys for both parties, this court finds
that the court below exercised sound discretion in admitting the
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evidence iu dispute and, since all our later decisions appear to
favor the judge using his discretion regarding the admissability of evidence, there can be no sufficient reason, so far as this
court is able to observe, advanced for having the evidence reviewed again; and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
The motion for a new trial is refused.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
If a witness is impeached by evidence that he has made
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the party
calling him, should have the opportunity to elicit from him, what
he may be able to say in rebuttal of the impeachment.
Ha
may contradict altogether, or he may qualify, by exposing the
difference between what he is alleged to have said and what
he concedes that he said. He may explain how the opinion that
he uttered the contradictory words, mistakenly arose.
But, this privilege of explanation or denial may be extended,
either during his cross-examination, or at a later stage of the
trial, by recalling the witness and permitting him to contradict or explain the impeaching testimony.
It cannot rmxatter
which of these expedients for discovery of the truth is adopted;
that of asking the witness, whether he has not said so and so,
in order that he may deny or explain, before the impeaching
testimony is heard; or that of waiting till such testimony is
heard, and then recalling him, in order to explain or deny.
Here X is not questioned during his cross-examination as
to the making of inconsistent declarations.
After he left .the
stand, the utterance of such statements is testified to by three
witnesses, X being still in court. He is recalled, but makes no
explanation or denial of the alleged prior remarks. He had
then, ample opportunity to set himself right with the jury,
had he been able to do so. It would be imbecillity on the part
of the court to assert that there was reversible error in not excluding the impeaching evidence because there had been no opportunity to anticipate that evidence by denial or explanation.
The court did not abuse its discretion. Cronkrite v. Trexler,
187 Pa. 100; Robinovitz v Silverman, 223 Pa. 139.
Affirmed.
ESTATE OF HENRY TRANSOM
Will--Intention of Testator- Remainder Over of Unexpended
Bequest.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There was an action by the administrator of the deceased widow
of Henry Transom against the executor of the estate of Henry
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Transom, claiming the unexpended part of the bequest made by
the said Henry Transom, on his death, to his wife. Henry Transom died leaving a will in which, among other provisions, he provided that, he bequeathed all his property to his wife. He then
said, "Should she not have expended the whole thereof at her
death, I give what remains to my brother Adam." The property
twas $50,000 invested in stocks, bonds and mortgages. The wife
used all the interest and in addition, $10,000 of the principal. Upon
her death, her administrator claims the residual $40,000 for which
this action is brought.
Obermiller, for the plaintiff.
Naame, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
POLISHER, J--The case at bar presents for decision a point
so well settled by the decisions of this Commonwealth that it
scarcely permits of argument. The point alluded to is thisUpon the death of a legatee to whom a bequest of personal property has been made by a testator with a remainder over of the
unexpended part on her death, who is entitled to the remanider,
her administrator or the executor of her testator?"
In the construction of every will the intention of the testator
is the thing to be inquired into; and the intent of the testator which
is to be discovered and carried out, means his actual personal ntent, not a mere conventional intent inferred from his use of any
set form or phrase. Hence, the solution of the question depends
upon the circumstances. It was said by Sharswood, C. J. in Fox's
Appeal, 99 Pa. 382 that, "Every will is to be construed from its
four corners to arrive at the true intention of the testator. Decisions upon other wills may assist, but cannot conrtol the construction."
We concede the rule invoked by the plaintiff that a gift of the
entire personality of the estate with no limitation over is an absolute gift of the entire property. Its application, however, is
limited in any particular instance, upon the fact whether the testator has employed language in a subsequent part of his will which
renders the will inoperative. It is with the desire to reduce to a
minimum the perplexity and uncertainty inseparable from the subject, that the Courts have established certain artificial and arbi.
trary canons o1 construction, by which certain forms of expression
are presumed to have certain meanings, and in doubtful cases,
these canons are held to be decisive. But all the cases are subservient to the great rule as to "intent", and are made to aid,
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not to override it. As in all such cases, "care is required that
the tools should not became fetters, and that the real end shall
not be sacrificed to what was intended only as a means of reaching it". Woelpper's Appeal, 126 Pa. 562.
Such is the case here. The first part of the bequest, standing alone, would pass an absolute gift. But this idea is negatived
when we read further, "Should she not have expended the whole
thereof at her death, I give what remains to my brother Adam".
By the use of that provision, the testator has explicitly disclaimed
the intention of giving the property to his wife forever. Hence, the
rule can have no application here, as it would defeat the intention
of the testator as disclosed by the language and circumstances of
the will.
We are not aware that Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa. 218, cited by
the plaintiff as the basis of his contention stands for any such
proposition as the plaintiff gathered from it-namely, that upon
the death of the widow, the remaining property goes to her
executor. As a matter of fact, the Court held to the contrary.
So that the authority which the plaintiff cited to establish his
claim, tends to, and does, clearly disprove his case.
A long line of decisions in this Commonwealth starting with
Sheet's Estate, 52 Pa. 257 and running to Shower's Estate, 211 Pa.
302, establishes the proposition, that, "If a testator in one part
of his will gives an absolute interest in personality to a person,
and in subsequent passages unequivocally shows that he intends
that the legatee take a lesser interest, the prior gift is restricted
accordingly."
The rule of law expressly applicable to the case at bar is
equally well fortified by a host of decisions, beginning with Kinter
vs. Jenks, 43 Pa. 445 and running to Philips' Estate, 209 Pa. 62,
which hold that, "The testator may vest such interest in his legatee
that he can exercise the rights of an absolute owner by sale, conversion, investment in his own name, use and consumption, without
appeal in his life time and yet, the estate be limited so that at the
legatee's death whatever remains unconsumed will go over."
The extent of the widow's consumption of the estate was
within her control. She had the right to consume or dispose of it
for herself. He actions during her life seem to have recognized
the limitations of her right,,-that is, existing only so long as she
the limitationse of her right,--that is, existing only so long as she
property at her death, it would be reasonable to suppose that she
would have done so by a will. But she made no will. And now the
plaintiff, as her administrator, is attempting to claim a right for
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her which she herself would not have dared to assert during her
lifetime. If such an unconscionable demand were acceeded to, it
would operate as a fraud upon his residuary legatees. We cannot
permit a double injustice ot be perpetrated.
Judgement must be rendered against the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The whole of a testator's intention is not expressed in one
sentence. Having bequeathed all his property to his wife, he immediately added a qualification. "Should she not have expended
the whole at her death, I give whatever remanis to my brother
Adam". The wife has expended some, but $40,000 remain at her
death unexpended. It belongs not to her or to her administrator,
but to Adam. The executor of Henry Transom is not entitled to
it, but Adam. Cf. Neuman's Estate, 229 Pa. 41; Dickinson's
Estate, 209 Pa. 59.
The decree of the learned Court below must be affirmed and
the appeal therefrom dismissed.

BOOK REVIEW
Cases on the Law of Donestic Relations and Persons, by
Edwin H. Woodruff, Dean of the College of Law of Cornell Uniwersity. Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York.
It is over thirty years since the first edition of this compilations
appeared. It has been used in a good many law schools, and the
demand for it has required a second, and, now a third edition. A
persual of many of the eases, convinces us of the justness of the
judgment which selected them. Many of them are extremely interesting, not an unimportant matter in a collection made for the
use of students. The cases are classified under Marriage, Parent
and Child, Infancy, Insanity, Drunkenness, and Aliens. Under Marriage are treated the contract to marry; breach of promise; contract of marriage; Husband and wife; Divorce and Separation.
Attention should be given to the fact that the book filling
750 pages, is of such size that the instructor will be able to cover
the whole ground in the time ordinarily devoted to this topic.
We know no collection of cases on the subject of equal merit, from
the standpoint of the needs of the student and instructor, in a
law school.

